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Comments
The Closed Door: A Need for Reform
of the California Mandatory Closure
Rule in Child Custody Cases
Predicated on Parental Abuse
As a general rule, American jurisprudence requires all judicial pro-
ceedings to be accessible and open to the public.' This rule is deeply
embedded in common-law traditions carried over from England2 and
historically is applicable in both civil and criminal settings In the
civil arena, the open trial policy is guided by common law4 and stat-
ute.' Publicity of criminal trials is a common-law tradition6 with the
additional support of the United States and California Constitutions.'
Under both constitutions, the "public trial" right is expressly guaran-
teed the criminal defendant.' The interest of the criminal defendant,
however, is not the only factor considered in determining whether the
public may gain access to the proceedings.
Two recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia9 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,'0 have established that the public also has an interest in
attending criminal trials, an interest that is protected by the first
1. See Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 750, 300 P.2d 163, 167 (1956).
2. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948); Kirstowsky, 143 Cal. App. 2d at 749-50, 300 P.2d at 166.
3. 448 U.S. at 580, n.17; Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979).
4. See Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 58, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495
(1964).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §124. "Except as provided in Sections 226m and 4306 of the Civil
Code or any other provisions of law, the sittings of every court shall be public." Id.
6. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 564-69, 580, n.17; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384; Oliver, 333 U.S. at
266.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, §15.
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; CAL. CONsT. art. I, §15; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 686.
9. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
10. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
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amendment." The net effect of these opinions is that now any order
denying public access to criminal trials must be justified by an overrid-
ing policy' 2 or a compelling state interest.' 3 Further, the closure order
must be narrowly tailored to serve the state interest.'
4
In light of the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Richmond
and Globe, this comment will analyze the validity of the practice in
California that excludes the public from custody proceedings' 5 which
are predicated on criminal conduct 6 of a parent 7 against his minor
child. 18 This analysis will focus on the similarity of the public interests
at stake in criminal trials and custody trials predicated on parental
abuse. Before addressing the similarities of the public interests at stake
in these two types of proceedings, this comment will first examine the
historical rationale and policy considerations for the open trial practice
in American jurisprudence. This discussion will be followed by a de-
tailed analysis of the three distinct public interests in open trials.
The first of these public interests is in the fair and effective adminis-
tration of justice, free from potential abuses that might otherwise occur
if the proceedings were closed. ' 9 This interest, in turn, serves two im-
portant functions: enhancing the accuracy of the fact finding process,20
and heightening public respect for the judicial system.2'
The second public interest in open trials that will be analyzed is hav-
ing wrongdoers brought to justice.22 In the context of a criminal prose-
cution for child abuse or neglect, the appropriate judicial remedy
usually involves a fine or imprisonment.23 In a custody trial, bringing
11. 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 599 (Stew-
art, J., concurring); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 102 S.Ct. at 2618.
12. 448 U.S. at 581.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
14. Id.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE §235.5 (providing that the public shall not be admitted to any proceed-
ing brought under section 232 of the Civil Code to free a minor from parental custody); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §346 (providing that the public shall not be admitted to a hearing brought
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 to declare a minor a dependent of the juvenile
court).
16. Criminal conduct refers to any conduct proscribed by the California Penal Code. For the
purposes of this comment the relevant Penal Code sections are 271, 271a, 273a, 273d, 273g, and
288, all of which relate to crimes against children. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
17. For the purposes of this comment, the term "parent" refers to any of the following: bio-
logical parent, adoptive parent, guardian, de facto parent, foster parent, or any other adult
charged with the custody, care and control of a minor child.
18. The term "child" refers to natural biological child, step-child, adoptive-child, foster-
child, or any other child dependent on an adult for care and support.
19. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
21. See infa notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
22. Sfee inra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§271, 271a, 273a, 273d, 273g, 288. Sections 271, 271a and 273g
are classified as misdemeanors and authorize a fine of not more than 500 dollars or imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than one year, or both. Sections 273a, 273d and 288 are classified
as felonies and authorize imprisonment in the state prison for from two to eight years.
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the wrongdoer to justice entails depriving him of the custody of his
child, either temporarily, 24 or permanently. 25 This comment will
demonstrate that notwithstanding the difference between the sanctions
imposed in each type of trial, the overall effect on the public is the
same. By virtue of having both types of proceedings publicly accessi-
ble, the public learns that neither society nor the law will tolerate pa-
rental abuse, and further, that wrongdoers meet with appropriate
sanctions.26
The final public interest in gaining access to judicial proceedings that
this comment will address is preserving the first amendment right to
attend trials.27 Any denial of access to trials must be justified by com-
pelling and overriding policy considerations z.2  Further, the preserva-
tion of this first amendment interest requires that public exclusion be
necessary and narrowly tailored to protect the competing interests of a
party involved in the proceeding. 29 Notwithstanding these three im-
portant interests, under certain limited circumstances public access to
judicial proceedings can be subordinated. To demonstrate this, various
common-law exceptions to the open trial policy will be identified.30
The discussion of these exceptions to the open trial policy will reveal
that under currently recognized judicial principles, trial judges can and
do exercise discretion in limiting public access.3 ' Despite the existence
of this discretionary authority, the present statutory scheme governing
custody cases to terminate parental rights and to declare minors depen-
dents of the court requires judges to conduct the proceedings in closed
session.3 2 This requirement frustrates the public's legitimate interests
in gaining access to the proceedings. The author will demonstrate that
the public interest in custody cases predicated on parental abuse bears
a substantial similarity to the public interest in criminal trials.33 Thus,
the impairment of the public interest in gaining access to custody pro-
ceedings predicated on parental abuse is particularly onerous. More-
over, the closure requirement completely disregards . the ability of
judges to determine whether the circumstances of a particular case ne-
cessitate closure.
For these reasons, the statutory provisions requiring public exclusion
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300.
25. CAL. CIV. CODE §232.
26. See infra notes 54-58, 133-36 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
28. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581; Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
29. 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
30. See infra notes 173-245 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 173-245 and accompanying text.
32. See CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346.
33. See infra notes 101-40 and accompanying text.
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in custody cases must be reformed. The mandatory closure require-
ment should be eliminated altogether so that judges can weigh all the
competing interests before limiting public access. Only in this way can
the public's valued interest in perpetuating the open trial policy effec-
tively be preserved.
GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PUBLICITY OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Historical Rationale
The underlying basis for the open trial policy in American jurispru-
dence is a fundamental intolerance for secret trials.34 Traditional An-
glo-American distrust of nonpublic proceedings has been ascribed to
the notorious use of this practice during the Spanish Inquisition, the
English Court of Star Chamber, and the French monarchy's lettre de
cachet." All of these institutions became instruments by which tyrants
and despots suppressed political and religious expression and severely
restricted individual liberties.36 By using the judiciary in this manner,
defendants' rights to fair trials were completely and ruthlessly
disregarded.37
In contrast to these historical abuses, the modem judicial practice
guarantees the accused the right to a public trial.3" The public trial
right not only confers a benefit on the defendant but on society as
well,39 by safeguarding against the use of the judiciary as an instrument
of persecution.4° This safeguard, in turn, serves as an effective restraint
on potential misuse ofjudicial power and promotes the fair administra-
tion of justice.41 From the historical standpoint, then, the open trial
policy operates first to ensure the defendant a fair trial, and second, to
subject the judiciary to public scrutiny as a check on possible judicial
abuses. In the modem application of the open trial policy, the "check"
34. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268.
35. Id. The Spanish Inquisition, reorganized in 1478, was a means by which alleged religious
heretics were punished. See WEBSTERS NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 1364 (2d. College Edition
1972). The English Court of Star Chamber originally had jurisdiction in cases in which the ordi-
nary course of justice was obstructed. During the reign of Henry VIII and his successors, the
jurisdiction of the court was illegally extended, especially in punishing disobedience to the king's
arbitrary proclamations, and it was finally abolished. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th
ed. 1979). Lettres de cachet were letters issued and signed by the kings of France, and counter-
signed by a secretary of state authorizing the imprisonment of a person. Id. at 815.
36. 333 U.S. at 268; Cembrook, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 59, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
37. 333 U.S. at 268.
38. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; CAL. CONsT. art. I, §15.
39. 333 U.S. at 270.
40. Id.
41. Id.; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383.
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function has received considerable emphasis by the courts.4 2
B. Modern Application of the Open Trial Policy
1. Fair and Effective Administration of Justice
The primary purpose of the "check" function is to expose abuses
such as corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favorit-
ism.43 The open trial policy also safeguards the fair administration of
justice by actually improving the fact finding process.44 This result is
accomplished in two ways. First, open court proceedings can elicit pre-
viously unknown witnesses from interested spectators 45 to come for-
ward with relevant evidence.46  Second, the mere fact that the
proceedings are open to public review induces the officers of the court
to perform their duties more conscientiously.47
By removing the potential for judicial abuses and enhancing the fact
finding process, the open trial practice succeeds in heightening public
respect for the judicial process. 48 Moreover, public participation in ap-
propriately conducted proceedings serves the broader purpose of main-
tainng the confidence of the community in the honesty of
governmental institutions49 and the ability of the law to do justice."
Without actual attendance at trials by the public or the public's repre-
sentative, the news media,5' the check on possible abuse or ineffective
administration of justice would be substantially attenuated. 2 On the
other hand, the open trial policy, which promotes public attendance,
serves to safeguard the interest in the fair and effective administration
of justice.
The importance of perpetuating the valued interest in the fair and
effective administration of justice warrants that only strong counter-
vailing public policy justifications will override the open trial prac-
tice.53 The interest in the fair and effective administration of justice,
42. See, e.g., Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Matter of Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 784,
136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1977); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 90
(Cal.App.1968) (opinion decertified as moot; hearing granted by the California Supreme Court).
43. Estate ofHearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 784, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
44. Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383.
45. 443 U.S. at 383; Cembrook, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 59, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
46. 443 U.S. at 383.
47. Id.
48. Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
49. Oxnard, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
50. Id.
51. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 572-73.
52. Oxnard, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 96. For this reason, the mere fact that a trial transcript was to
become a matter of public record at the culmination of the trial did not suffice to adequately serve
the public interest. Id.; see also United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981)(follow-
ing the reasoning in Oxnard).
53. Estate ofHearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 784, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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however, is not the only interest involved in a trial. The more personal
societal interest in bringing wrongdoers to justice must also be
considered.
2 Interests of Society in Bringing Wrongdoers to Justice
The open trial policy fulfills an important public purpose by provid-
ing interested spectators a firsthand opportunity to observe society's re-
sponses to unlawful behavior. 4 In this context, the open trial policy
addresses emotional reaction to social misconduct and alleviates the
human urge to punish on an individual basis. Public awareness that an
innocent victim of wrongful conduct is adequately compensated and
that the wrongdoer meets with an appropriate judicial remedy serves to
ameliorate community hostility and outrage for a particular social
transgression.
55
The effect of the open trial policy on the interest in bringing wrong-
doers to justice is essentially a prophylactic one. 6 Public attendance at
judicial proceedings effectively reduces community tension and indig-
nation that might otherwise take the form of vengeful self-help or vigi-
lantism.5 7 The societal concern with bringing wrongdoers to justice
must be addressed by the legal process to prevent this type of anarchist
behavior and to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. This re-
quires public acceptance of both the judicial process and the ultimate
result.5 8 The open trial practice is strongly supported by these policy
considerations of promoting obedience to the law and respect for the
legal system. In addition to these policy considerations, a final interest
in open trials is the public's first amendment right to attend trials.
3. First Amendment Guarantees
Two recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia59 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,6" unequivocally established that the public right of access to
criminal trials is a fundamental right guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.61 Richmond presented a case of first impression in which the
Court considered whether a criminal trial could be closed upon the un-
opposed request of the defendant.6 2 The underlying facts generating
54. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 571.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Oxnard, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
58. 448 U.S. at 571.
59. 448 U.S. 555.
60. 102 S. Ct. 2613.
61. 448 U.S. at 580; 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
62. 448 U.S. at 564.
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the constitutional issue involved a prosecution for murder.63
The first trial had been reversed on appeal by the state supreme court
because the trial court improperly admitted incriminating evidence.64
Both the second and third trials ended in mistrials." During the fourth
trial, the defendant's counsel moved the court to clear the courtroom of
all spectators.66 There being no objection from the prosecution, the
judge granted the motion and ordered the proceedings to be conducted
in closed court.67
Two reporters from Richmond Newspaper, Inc., however, did object.
They argued that unless the judge determined that the defendant's fair
trial right could not be protected by less drastic measures, constitu-
tional considerations mandated that the proceedings remain publicly
accessible.68 The court rejected this contention and continued the mur-
der trial in closed session.69 Ultimately, the defendant was acquitted.
70
Despite the fact that the underlying trial had long since ended, the
United States Supreme Court granted the petition of the newspaper for
a writ of certiorari.7 t The Court held that this was a situation "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." 72 In the final resolution of the case,
the Court agreed with the contention of the newspaper and reversed the
decision of the state court.
Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion for the Court, ob-
served that the first amendment "can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials.' ' 73 From this premise, the Chief Justice held
that the right to attend criminal trials is an implicit guarantee of the
first amendment. 74 The importance of this guarantee requires that only
an overriding state interest articulated in the findings can justify exclu-
sion of the public.75 Since the defendant's counsel failed to advance a
compelling reason for closure, the exclusion of the public and the me-
dia was constitutionally impermissible.76
The Court was presented with the opportunity to apply this principle
two years later in Globe. At issue in this case was a Massachusetts stat-




67. Id. at 560.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 562.
71. Id. at 563.
72. Id. (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
73. Id. at 575.
74. Id. at 580.
75. Id. at 581.
76. See id.
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ute requiring mandatory closure of specified sex offense trials during
the testimony of minor victims. 77 In the underlying controversy, repre-
sentatives of Globe Newspaper Co. had unsuccessfully petitioned the
trial court to remain present during a rape trial involving three minor
female victims.7 8
The trial judge construed the statute so as to exclude the public and
press from the entire trial.79 On appeal, the state supreme court modi-
fied this broad construction and held that the statute mandated public
exclusion only during the testimony of minor victims.80 Despite this
narrowing of the statutory construction, the United States Supreme
Court found the mandatory closure rule to be a violation of the first
amendment.81
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, held that although the inter-
est of the state in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor" is compelling, "it does not justify a mandatory-clo-
sure rule."82 According to Justice Brennan, theper se rule is unneces-
sary because the interests of the state can be promoted by requiring the
trial judge to make a determination on a case-by-case basis whether
closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim.83 More-
over, because the denial of public access to trials implicates the first
amendment,84 the Court concluded that the denial must be necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, 85 and further, that closure must
be narrowly tailored to serve the asserted interest. 86 In order to under-
stand the reason why the first amendment is implicated by denying
public access to trials, the protected rights encompassed in that amend-
ment must be examined.
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that a
core purpose of the first amendment is to assure free communication
and discussion of matters relating to the functioning of government.87
Further, the guarantees of this amendment provide a means by which
the public can effectively participate in the United States republican
77. 102 S. Ct. at 2615-16.
78. Id. at 2616.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2617.
81. Id. at 2618.
82. Id. at 2621 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. An additional interest asserted by the Commonwealth was to encourage minor vic-
tims of sex crimes to come forward and testify accurately. Id. at 2622. This interest was held to be
both speculative and illogical, thus incapable of justifying the blanket exclusion of the public
during the minor victim's testimony. Id.
84. Id. at 2619.
85. Id. at 2620.
86. Id.
87. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575; Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
1983 / Custody Hearings
system of self-government. 88 To ensure the informed communication
of government affairs relating to the judicial process, the first amend-
ment necessarily must embrace the public right of access to trials.8 9
Any contrary interpretation of the first amendment would substantially
dilute the specifically enumerated guarantees of free speech and press
as they pertain to judicial proceedings.9"
Although the foregoing discussion regarding the purpose of the first
amendment focuses on the public right of access to trials in general, it
should be noted that the actual holdings of the Court in both Richmond
and Globe relate specifically to criminal trials.9 Nevertheless, the
opinions in both cases are devoid of any language suggesting that the
first amendment guarantees a right of access only to criminal trials.
Since one of the core purposes of the first amendment is to assure free
discussion of government affairs,92 limiting this discussion to criminal
trials is illogical. The Court in Richmond did not pass on the issue of
whether the first amendment also guarantees a right of access to civil
trials because the question was not raised.93 Notwithstanding this fact,
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, concluded that the first
amendment protects the public right of access to criminal as well as
civil trials.94
In summary, the policy considerations for publicity of judicial pro-
ceedings are historically based on traditional Anglo-American distrust
for closed trials due to abuses perpetrated by the European ruling
classes in the past.9  The modem application of the open trial policy
serves three important functions. First, it assures the fair and effective
administration of justice. Subjecting judicial proceedings to public
scrutiny reduces the potential for abuse?6 and improves accuracy in the
fact finding process. 7 Secondly, the open trial policy serves a thera-
peutic function by reducing community outrage and indignation when
an innocent person becomes the victim of wrongful conduct.9" The
third function served by a policy of open trials is the protection of the
public's first amendment right to communicate on matters relating to
the functioning of government. 99
88. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring); 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
90. 448 U.S. at 576-77, 580.
91. Id. at 559 (murder trial); 102 S. Ct. at 2616 (rape trial).
92. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
93. 448 U.S. at 580, n.17.
94. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
95. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
96. See mipra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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As a general proposition, each of these distinct public interests in
gaining access to judicial proceedings applies with equal force to all
types of actions coming before the courts. In addressing the applica-
tion of these interests to particular cases, however, courts have empha-
sized criminal prosecutions rather than civil suits."°° This emphasis
can be explained by the fact that ordinarily more is at stake in a crimi-
nal trial. The risk for a criminal defendant who is adjudged guilty of a
charged offense is a deprivation of liberty by imprisonment. By the
same token, societal concern with bringing wrongdoers to justice is
more. intense when a shocking and particularly atrocious crime has
been committed.
These factors, however, are not necessarily limited to criminal trials.
Child custody cases predicated on parental abuse also can incite strong
emotional reactions from the community and a concomitant concern
with bringing the abusive parent to justice. Since the judicial remedy
imposed on the parent can be as serious as the permanent deprivation
of the custody of his child and a total termination of parental rights,10'
the parent has quite a large stake in the outcome of the proceedings.
Due to the high stakes and public concern in custody cases predicated
on parental abuse, the public interest in gaining access to the proceed-
ings is closely analogous to the public interest in attending criminal
trials. To fully understand the basis for this analogy, a discussion of
custody cases predicated on parental abuse will follow.
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS PREDICATED ON PARENTAL ABUSE
A. Basis for the Action
California courts review parental abuse and neglect in two separate
classes of child custody proceedings: involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights'0 and actions to declare minors dependents of the juvenile
court.10 3 In either class of proceedings, an abused or neglected child
can be removed from parental custody."° The same conduct giving
rise to either of these custody actions also can be the basis of a criminal
prosecution. Specifically, this conduct includes: (1) desertion of a child
100. The interest in the fair and effective administration of justice originally evolved to protect
a criminal defendant's fair trial rights. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Similarly,
the interest in bringing wrongdoers to justice is a natural component of criminal trials. See supra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Finally, the first amendment protection of the public's right
of access to trials has only been extended to criminal trials. See supra notes 59-61, 91 and accom-
panying text.
101. See CAL. CIV. CODE §232.
102. Id.
103. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300.
104. See id. §361(b); CAL. CIv. CODE §232; Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication; Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226, 240 (1975).
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under age 14 with intent to abandon; 105 (2) abandonment or failure to
maintain a child under age 14 and false representation to authorities
that the child is an orphan;"o6 (3) willful cruelty or unjustifiable punish-
ment of a child that endangers the child's life or health;'0 7 (4) corporal
punishment or injury of a child resulting in a traumatic condition; 108
(5) indulgence in degrading, immoral, or vicious practices, or habitual
drunkenness in the presence of a child;0 9 and (6) willful commission of
lewd or lascivious acts upon or with the body of a child under age
14.110
Although a criminal prosecution for child abuse and a custody trial
are independent proceedings, the underlying cause for bringing each
type of action - parental abuse or neglect - is the same. To fully
appreciate the similarity between criminal child abuse cases and cus-
tody cases predicated on parental abuse, the sequence of events leading
up to a custody case of this nature must be examined. Once this is
accomplished, the identity of the public interest in each type of pro-
ceeding will become apparent.
In the most common custody case scenario, a minor child who has
been the victim of parental misconduct is adjudged a dependent of the
juvenile court at a dependency hearing."' The circumstances giving
rise to the dependency hearing in the first place normally occur as a
result of parental neglect,1 2 such as abandonment 1 3 or desertion,1 4 or
as a result of parental abuse,' 15 such as cruelty,1 6 severe corporal pun-
ishment, 1 7 or sexuar abuse." 8 Additionally, the child may be adjudg-
ed a dependent of the juvenile court if he is deemed to be in an unfit
home"I9 by virtue of the moral depravity or habitual drug or alcohol
abuse of his parents.
120
When a child is adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court, the
judge may order the child's removal from his parents.' 2' If removal is






111. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300.
112. See id. §300(a), (b), (d).
113. Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §271a.
114. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(a), (b), (d). Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE
§27 1.
115. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(d).
116. Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §273a.
117. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(d). Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §273d.
118. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(d). Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §288.
119. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(d).
120. Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §273g.
121. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §361(b).
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ordered, the child is remanded to the custody of a probation officer and
placed in a temporary accommodation. 122 At this point in the scenario,
every effort is made to reunite the child with his parents. 23 Unless the
court determines that reunification would create a substantial risk to
the child's physical or emotional well-being, the child will be returned
to the custody of his parents. 124
In the event that efforts to reunite the child with his parents fail and
the parents continue to be deprived of custody for one year, an action
to permanently sever the child-parent relationship may be initiated. 125
While deprivation of custody for one year and the child's dependency
status are requirements to maintain this action, 26 the underpinning of
the action is parental misconduct. The basis for the termination pro-
ceeding is the original cruel treatment, abuse, or neglect that the child
suffered prior to being declared a dependent of the juvenile court.' 27
This parental misconduct is equivalent to the type of conduct that
would give rise to a criminal prosecution. 28  Thus, the underlying
cause for a custody trial based on parental abuse and for a criminal
prosecution for child abuse -parental misconduct - is the same.
Due to this similarity in the types of proceedings, the public interest
that each would generate is also the same. As noted earlier, the public
has three distinct interests in gaining access to judicial proceedings.' 29
These interests apply with equal force to custody trials predicated on
parental abuse.
B. Public Interests in Custody Proceedings Predicated on Parental
Abuse
In the context of a custody trial, the most traditional of the interests
in the open trial policy is to assure the fair and effective administration
of justice by subjecting the officers of the court to public scrutiny.130
122. See id. §362.
123. See id. §366.
124. Id. §366.2(d).
125. See CAL. CIV. CODE §232(a)(2), (3). The action to terminate parental rights may be
initiated by the State Department of Social Services, the county welfare department, a licensed
private or public adoption agency, a county adoption department or a county probation depart-
ment for the purpose of freeing the child for adoption. Id. §232.9.
126. Id. §232(a)(2), (3). But see id. §232(a)(I) wherein the one year deprivation requirement
and the child's dependency status are not prerequisites for maintaining the action. This subsection
authorizes the termination of parental rights if the parent has totally abandoned the child and left
him without provisions for identification or support. Id. Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE
§§271, 271a.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE §232(a)(2), (3). Compare id with CAL. PENAL CODE §§273a, 273d, 273g,
288.
128. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 43-61, 84-94 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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This scrutiny, in turn, serves to reduce the potential for abuse"' and
enhances the accuracy of the fact finding process.'32 Closure of the
proceedings disserves this interest by insulating the judge and prosecut-
ing attorney from public observation.
When a child has been abandoned or cruelly treated by his parent,
the public also has an interest in knowing that the offending parent
meets with an appropriate judicial remedy for the wrong committed. 133
Public access serves a prophylactic function by allaying public indigna-
tion and community tension. 34 Moreover, public access is a vehicle for
informing interested community members that the abused child is be-
ing protected from further cruel or neglectful treatment. 135 In this
manner, public attendance at custody trials serves an educational pur-
pose by making the public aware of two important facts. First, when a
parent abuses his child, that parent must endure the deprivation of the
custody of the child. 136 Second, the public becomes aware that society
and the law will not tolerate abusive behavior by parents.
The final interest of the public in gaining access to custody trials is
the exercise of the first amendment right of communicating on matters
concerning the functioning of government. 37 Any intrusion on this
right should be justified by a compelling reason,13 8 such as serious
detriment to the parent's individual security, 39 or the need to protect
the well-being of the child from physical or psychological harm.
140
Whatever the compelling reason may be, the necessity for closure
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.' 4 1 Only in this way can
the public's first amendment right to attend trials be protected. 42
Notwithstanding the importance of these three public interests and the
identity of parental misconduct as the underlying cause for both crimi-
nal and custody trials predicated on abuse, the public is not permitted
to attend the custody proceedings. The current statutory scheme in
California excludes the general public from gaining access to custody
131. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
135. When a child is adjudged to be a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, the court may remove the child from the parent's custody. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §361(b); see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. When an abused
child is declared free from the custody and control of his parents under civil code section 232, the
child is naturally removed from the abusive environment. See CAL. CIV. CODE §232(a)(l)-(3).
136. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300 (temporary loss of custody); CAL. CIV. CODE §232
(permanent loss of custody).
137. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 75, 84-86 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2621; see infra notes 239, 242-45 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
142. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580-81; Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
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cases that come before the juvenile court in dependency hearings 43
and custody cases initiated to terminate parental rights."'
C. Mandatory Closure
The mandatory closure requirement sets dependency hearings and
termination proceedings apart from other custody cases in California.
In all other cases in which the issue of custody of a minor child arises,
the Civil Code provides that the "court may, in its discretion, exclude
the public." '145 A discretionary closure of this nature adequately pro-
tects the parties involved from any serious detriment that might other-
wise result if the proceedings were open.46 In addition, the
discretionary authority to close custody cases ensures that the court can
conduct the proceedings in a manner consistent with the proper admin-
istration of justice. 47 The following examination of pertinent legisla-
tive history reveals that the current closure requirements are
unwarranted.
L Legislative History
The reason dependency hearings and termination proceedings con-
tain the mandatory closure requirement seems to be more a fluke of
legislative history rather than a deliberate attempt to undermine the
discretionary authority of judges to limit public access. Originally,
both dependency hearings and termination proceedings came under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.14 8 The juvenile court also had
jurisdiction over wardship hearings in which delinquent minors are
made wards of the court. 149 The provisions of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code governing these proceedings made no distinction between
minors who were uncontrollable delinquents and minors who were
merely victims of cruel or neglectful treatment. 50 As a consequence,
the closure requirement pertaining to these proceedings was very
broad. The provision established that any person alleged or adjudged
to come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was entitled to a
private hearing.'
5'
The rationale behind the provision for private hearings in juvenile
143. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346.
144. CAL. CIv. CODE §235.5.
145. Id. §4600(c) (emphasis added).
146. See infra notes 229-30, 239 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
148. See 1937 Cal. Stat. c. 369, at 1030, 1032 (repealed by 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §1, at 3459).
149. Wardship hearings are presently governed by sections 601 and 602 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
150. See 1937 Cal. Stat. c. 369, at 1030-31, (repealed by 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §1, at 3459).
151. See 1937 Cal. Stat. c. 369, at 1037, (repealed by 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §1, at 3459).
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court is that confidentiality is essential for the ultimate rehabilitation of
juvenile delinquents.1 5 2 By denying public access to the proceedings
and the records of the proceedings, the delinquent minor is protected
from future adverse effects of youthful misconduct. 53 When the mis-
conduct is that of the parent rather than the child, however, the ration-
ale for confidential proceedings breaks down.
In 1961, the California Legislature revised the statutory scheme gov-
erning juvenile hearings.'54 As a result of this revision, juvenile court
jurisdiction over termination proceedings was eliminated. 5 5 Thereaf-
ter, termination proceedings have come within the jurisdiction of the
superior court.'5 6 The 1961 revisions left intact juvenile court jurisdic-
tion over the other juvenile proceedings, but significantly, distinguished
dependency 157 from wardship hearings."" The closure requirement for
these juvenile proceedings, however, still made no distinction between
dependency and wardship cases.' 5 9 Distinguishing juvenile court de-
pendents from wards with respect to confidentiality of the proceedings
did not come about until 1976, when the Legislature again revised the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
160
When the 1961 revisions were enacted, the California Legislature ne-
glected to include a closure requirement for termination proceedings.
Thus, in 1965, the Legislature added section 235.5 to the Civil Code
effectuating the closure requirement in termination proceedings.' 6' As
a result of all the additions and revisions implemented, public exclu-
sion has become a statutory mandate for termination proceedings, de-
pendency hearings, and wardship hearings. The closure requirement,
which originally was justified only by a desire to protect juvenile delin-
quents from the adverse effects of their youthful transgressions, has
been inadvertently applied to cases in which the rationale is inapposite.
In termination proceedings and dependency hearings predicated on pa-
rental abuse, the issue is the parent's misconduct; the child is only a
152. See Comment, Delinquency Hearings and the First Amendment: Reassessing Juvenile
Court Confidentiality Upon the Demise of "Conditional Access", 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 123, 126-27
(1979).
153. Id. at 127.
154. 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §§1-14, at 3459-3507 (repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§550-
911, adding CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§500-914, CAL. PENAL CODE §272, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§232-38).
155. Id., c. 1616, §1, at 3459, §4, at 3504 (adding CAL. CIV. CODE §232).
156. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §10, (providing in pertinent part, "[s]uperior courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction in all cases except those given by statute to other trial courts.").
157. See 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §2 at 3471.
158. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§601, 602 (enacted by 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §2, at 3471-
72).
159. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §676 (enacted by 1961 Cal. Stat. c. 1616, §2, at 3480).
160. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346 (enacted by 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1068, §9, at 4769).
161. 1965 Cal. Stat. c. 1530, §2, at 3623 (adding CAL. CIv. CODE §235.5).
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victim. In contrast, wardship proceedings focus on the misconduct of
the child. Moreover, termination proceedings and dependency hear-
ings are distinguishable from wardship proceedings in that they bear a
substantial relationship to other custody proceedings.
2. Comparison with Other Custody Cases
The standard used to determine whether a child should be removed
from parental custody in either a termination or a dependency case is
the same standard employed by the courts in all other custody actions.
Section 4600 of the Civil Code, which applies to any proceeding in
which custody issues can be litigated,1 62 requires that before custody of
a child is awarded to a nonparent, the court must make a finding that
parental custody would be detrimental to the child. 163 Despite the sim-
ilarity of termination proceedings and dependency hearings to other
custody actions, the discretionary authority of judges to limit public
access under section 4600'11 does not extend to termination and depen-
dency cases.
In order to promote consistency among all custody cases, the statu-
tory provisions governing dependency hearings 165 and termination pro-
ceedings 6 6 should be reformed to allow judges discretionary authority
to control public access rather than requiring mandatory exclusion of
the general public. More importantly, however, the public's valued in-
terests in having open dependency hearings and termination proceed-
ings167 mandate that the closure requirements written into the statutes
be eliminated. Although the closure provisions, as they currently
stand, do permit two very narrow and limited exceptions to the blanket
closure requirement, 68 neither exception fully considers the public's le-
gitimate interests in gaining access to the proceedings.
3. Exceptions to Mandatory Closure
The first of the exceptions to the closure requirement permits the
public to be admitted to the proceedings only if public attendance is
specifically requested by the child and his parents. 69 Under this excep-
162. CAL. CIV. CODE §4600(a); see also In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 695-96, 523 P.2d 244, 255-
56, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444,455-56 (1974). "California has at least eight separate proceedings in which
custody questions can be litigated." Id.
163. CAL. CIV. CODE §4600(c).
164. Id.
165. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5.
167. See supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
168. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346; CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5 (with respect to these excep-
tions, the language in both statutes is substantially the same).
169. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346; CAL. CIV.. CODE §235.5.
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tion only the desires of the parties involved are considered while the
competing interests of the public are ignored. The second exception to
the closure requirement is equally restrictive. That provision allows
the judge to admit those persons "deemed to have a direct and legiti-
mate interest in the particular case or work of the court."' 70 This class
of persons, however, represents a very small segment of society. The
class includes relatives or close friends of the minor, law enforcement
personnel, students, and members of community groups interested in
studying court procedures.17' All persons attending these custody pro-
ceedings must promise not to disclose the identity of the minor or the
parents, or any details of the case that might reveal the identity of the
participants. 72 By comparison, this type of restriction is not placed on
members of the general public who attend criminal child abuse trials,
even though the underlying theory - parental misconduct - is the
same. Clearly, both statutory exceptions to the mandatory closure re-
quirement applicable to dependency hearings and termination pro-
ceedings are extremely limited in scope.
In determining whether public exclusion from custody trials is war-
ranted, the courts should apply existing judicial principles rather than
adhering to the strict rule of closure. Several common-law exceptions
to the open trial policy currently are recognized by the courts in other
proceedings to protect trial participants and witnesses. Eliminating the
mandatory closure rule in dependency and termination proceedings
would leave discretionary authority to limit public access intact.
Courts still would weigh the competing interests of the public in gain-
ing access to the proceedings against the considerations embodied in
the common-law exceptions. A discussion of these exceptions will fa-
cilitate an understanding of the way in which they can be incorporated
into custody trials.
RECOGNIZED ExCEPTIONS TO PUBLICITY OF PROCEEDINGS
A. The Right to a Fair Trial
In the setting of a criminal trial, the defendant's right to a fair trial
takes precedence over the public interest in gaining access to the pro-
ceedings.17 The fair trial right is considered to be among the most fun-
damental freedoms enjoyed by United States citizens, 174 and therefore,
170. See CAL. WELF & INST. CODE §346; CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5.
171. CAL. R. CT. 1311 (Advisory Committee Comment).
172. Id.; see also Comment supra note 152 at 136-40, 148-69.
173. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 564 (wherein the Court characterized this interest as "the
defendant's superior right to a fair trial." (emphasis added)).
174. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
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is a basic requirement of due process.1 75 For this reason, if the defend-
ant demonstrates a substantial probability that his fair trial right would
be irreparably damaged 176 by having the proceedings open, an order
for closure may be appropriate.
The criminal defendant may not, however, exclude the public merely
by waiving his constitutional right to a public trial. The United States
Supreme Court, specifically addressing that issue, has held that a de-
fendant's desire to waive the right to a public trial does not carry with it
the right to insist on closure. 177 Moreover, courts have been unwilling
to grant a defendant's request for closure absent substantial proof that
he will otherwise be subjected to prejudice. '78This is consistent with the
stringent requirements set forth in Richmond and Globe requiring the
defendant to bear a heavy burden of establishing the necessity for
closure. 179
1 Criteria to Justfy Public Exclusion
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 80 has suggested a three-pronged test that a criminal defendant
must satisfy before his request for closure is granted. 8 First, the de-
fendant must establish that conducting the proceedings in public will
irreparably damage his fair trial right.182 Second, he must demonstrate
a substantial probability that alternatives to closure will not adequately
protect his right to a fair trial. 183 Finally, the defendant must show that
closure will be effective in eliminating the perceived harm.'8 4 Only af-
ter Justice Blackmun's proposed criteria justifying closure have been
satisfied can the conflict between the defendant seeking closure and the
public's interest in open trials be resolved in the defendant's favor.
A similar conflict between the competing interests of the public and
an abusive parent can occur in a custody proceeding. When the parent
seeks to preclude public attendance from the proceedings, he should be
required to advance a compelling justification for closure. The parent's
own interests in privacy should not transcend the interests of the gen-
175. See id. at 543.
176. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
177. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965).
178. See San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 512, 638 P.2d 655, 663,
179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 780 (1982).
179. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581; Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
180. 443 U.S. at 406-48.
181. Id. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 441.
183. Id.; for examples of alternatives to closure, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-
62 (1966); see infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
184. 443 U.S. at 442.
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eral public in having justice fairly and effectively administered,18 5 or
the interests of community members indignant over a particular wrong
committed against a child.8 6 Under Justice Blackmun's three-pronged
test in Gannett, 8 7 the parent would be required to prove that a substan-
tial probability exists that his right to a fair trial would be jeopardized
by public attendance. Alternatively, the parent seeking to have the trial
closed should justify this position by demonstrating that public access
would lead to events tending to undermine his individual security, per-
sonal liberty, or private property.18 The impairment of these interests
conceivably could result from widespread publicity of the proceedings.
Because of the potential for publicity to damage the fair trial right, this
subject has received considerable attention by the courts.
2 Adverse Publicity
Two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the mid-
1960's, Estes v. Texas 89 and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 9 ' addressed the is-
sue of fairness to defendants in light of prejudicial publicity. 9' In both
opinions, the Court found that excessive and prejudicial coverage by
the news media resulted in a denial of the defendants' constitutional
rights to fair trials. 192 Although each case held that the trial judges had
failed to protect the defendants' fair trial interests from prejudicial me-
dia coverage, the Court nonetheless declined to suggest a total exclu-
sion of the media or public during the new trials ordered. 93 Instead,
the Court recommended that when prejudicial news coverage prior to
trial threatens the fair trial right, the "judge should continue the case
until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated
with publicity."'' 94 The Court also suggested sequestration of the jury
195
and if "publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the
trial, a new trial should be ordered."'196
The above cited remedies are all viable alternatives to closure,' 97
which must necessarily be considered by a trial court before an order
185. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
188. Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 784, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
189. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
190. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
191. 381 U.S. at 534-35, 548; 384 U.S. at 335, 362.
192. 381 U.S. at 534-35, 548; 384 U.S. at 335, 362.
193. The possibility of closure was not discussed in either opinion. See 384 U.S. at 333-63; 381
U.S. at 532-52.
194. 384 U.S. at 363.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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for closure is made.'98 Under Justice Blackmun's three-pronged test in
Gannett,'99 the availability of alternatives to closure will defeat the de-
fendant's efforts to exclude the public from the actual trial. Moreover,
in the aftermath of Richmond and Globe, the likelihood that a defend-
ant's motion for closure would be granted is even less probable in light
of the public's first amendment right to attend trials.2 In matters con-
cerning pretrial proceedings, however, the courts have been more leni-
ent in granting defendants' requests for closure.2"'
The issue of whether defendants in a murder prosecution could ex-
clude the public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing was
before the United States Supreme Court in Gannett.202 In that case, the
Court affirmed the action of the trial court in granting the defendants'
request to exclude the public.2"3 The decision of the trial court was ap-
proved for two reasons. First, since the purpose of suppression hear-
ings is to screen out unreliable and illegally obtained evidence,2°4 the
closure order was an appropriate method of ensuring the defendants a
fair trial by preventing dissemination of inadmissable evidence to po-
tential jurors. 0 5 Second, the denial of public access to the proceedings
and the records was only temporary.20 6 Once the danger of prejudice
to the defendants had passed, the records were to become available for
public review.
207
A similar situation arose in two California cases, San Jose Mercury-
News v. Municipal Court2 8 and Cromer v. Superior Court,209 in which
the criminal defendants requested that the press and public be denied
access to the preliminary hearings and hearing transcripts pending their
trials.219 Both reviewing courts held that the defendants' requests for
public exclusion were properly granted so as to preserve their fair trial
rights by preventing the dissemination of inadmissible or prejudicial
198. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
199. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
200. 448 U.S. at 580; 102 S. Ct. at 2618.
201. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 378-79 (pretrial suppression hearing); San Jose Mercury.
News, 30 Cal. 3d at 513-14, 638 P.2d at 664-65, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82; Cromer v. Superior
Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675 (1980) (preliminary hearing); Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 214-15, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 443 (1975); Craemer v. Superior
Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 225-26, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201 (1968) (sealing grand jury transcripts).
202. 443 U.S. at 375.
203. Id. at 394.
204. Id. at 378.
205. Id. at 379.
206. Id. at 393.
207. Id.
208. 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982).
209. 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1980).
210. San Jose Mercury-News, 30 Cal. 3d at 501, 638 P.2d at 656, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 773; Cromer,
109 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 672; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §868 (public excluded
from preliminary hearings at the defendant's request).
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evidence to potential jurors.2 1' Moreover, since the orders denying
public access were temporary,21 2 the intrusion on the public's first
amendment right to observe the judicial system2 3 was a minor one.214
The temporary denial of public access in both of these cases was thus in
keeping with the rationale of Gannett.215 The defendants were pro-
tected from prejudicial publicity and the public eventually was allowed
access to the hearing transcripts.
The last type of pretrial proceeding to which the public may not gain
access so that the defendant's fair trial right may be preserved is a
grand jury hearing. The public is neither allowed to attend these hear-
ings2 16 nor permitted to gain access to the hearing transcript if the de-
fendant so requests. 217  Thus, in Craemer v. Superior Court218 and
Rosato v. Superior Court,219 both reviewing courts approved the sealing
of the grand jury transcripts until the completion of the defendants'
trials to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial and inadmissible evi-
dence.22° In all the circumstances cited above in which public exclu-
sion was authorized, the closure or denial of access was of a limited
scope and duration.221 Moreover, the orders limiting public access were
all consistent with the holding in Globe in that they were narrowly tai-
lored222 to serve the interest of protecting the defendant from prejudi-
cial publicity before the trial began. The primary purpose of public
exclusion in each case was to ensure the defendants a fair trial by
preventing potential jurors from gaining access to prejudicial or other-
wise inadmissible evidence. The gravamen of these cases is that public
concern and curiosity with judicial proceedings must be controlled by
the courts to prevent excessive publicity from jeopardizing the fair trial
right. The detrimental effects of publicity, however, are by no means
limited to criminal cases.
Just as a criminal trial can generate a great deal of publicity,223 a
211. San Jose Mercury-News, 30 Cal. 3d at 512, 638 P.2d at 663, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 780; Cromer,
109 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
212. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393.
213. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581; Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2618.
214. Cromer, 109 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
215. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
216. See CAL. PENAL CODE §891.
217. See id. §938.1(b).
218. 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
219. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).
220. See Craemer, 265 Cal. App. 2d at 227, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 201; Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at
207, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
221. All of the cases cited in this section pertain only to pretrial proceedings rather than the
actual trials. Furthermore, the orders sealing the records were only in effect until the trials had
commenced or were completed. See supra notes 206-07, 210-11, 220 and accompanying text.
222. 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
223. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 371-74; Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 338-45; Cromer, 109 Cal.
App. 3d at 734-35, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75 (public interest and curiosity were substantial).
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custody case might also generate considerable publicity, when, for ex-
ample, the parties involved are celebrities. 24 Similarly, a custody case
may induce a heightened degree of public interest when the conduct of
the parent is particularly atrocious. 225 The effect of widespread public-
ity in a custody case, however, is distinguishable from the effect of pub-
licity in a criminal trial.
In the criminal trial setting, widespread publicity can damage the
defendant's fair trial right by allowing potential jurors to become ac-
quainted with inadmissible and prejudicial information about the
case.226 The criminal defendant's right to a fair trial would be seriously
jeopardized if members of the jury were exposed to inflammatory in-
formation by the news media. In custody cases, this danger is substan-
tially reduced because the judge, rather than a jury, is the trier of
fact.227 Since a judge is presumed to consider only competent evidence
in arriving at his decision,228 the parent's fair trial right in a custody
proceeding would not be impaired by excessive publicity.
Widespread adverse publicity, however, might create other risks to a
parent involved in a custody trial. If these risks to a parent are substan-
tial, the interests of a parent in seeking closure may override the pub-
lic's competing interest in gaining access to the trial.229 For example, if
a parent can demonstrate that publicity or public attendance will un-
dermine his individual security, personal liberty, or private property,
23 0
a request for closure might well be granted. Even on a showing of this
type of detriment, however, the trial court should still weigh the com-
peting public interests in gaining access to the proceedings before or-
dering closure.
All of the examples in the foregoing discussion focus on situations in
which a party desires the proceedings to be closed.23 t In addition to
224. A notorious example of this type of intense publicity occurred in the 1934 custody battle
over Gloria Vanderbilt that was bitterly fought between the child's mother and aunt. See gener-
ally B. GOLDSMITH, LIrrLE GLORIA. . .HAPPY AT LAST (1980).
225. The type of child abuse depicted by Christina Crawford in her best seller MOMMIM
DEAREST (1978) would fit in this category. The author stated that her mother had on occasion
denied her solid foods over the course of several days. Id. at 42-44. In addition, according to the
author, both she and her brother were victims of cruel physical abuse. Id. at 36, 47, 51-54, 133-34.
226. See supra notes 192-96, 202-22 and accompanying text.
227. Custody trials are special proceedings to which the right to a jury trial does not attach.
See In re David E., 85 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635, 150 Cal. Rptr. 790, 791 (1978); Kinder v. Superior
Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 574, 581, 144 Cal. Rptr. 291, 296 (1978); People v. One 1941 Chevrolet
Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951).
228. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695, 708 (8th Cir. 1932), ay?'d, 289 U.S. 1 (1932);
Santos v. Perreira, 633 P.2d 1118, 1124 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981).
229. See Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 784, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
230. Id.
231. In the criminal trial setting, a defendant will request that the public be excluded from the
proceedings in order to prevent potential jurors from gaining access to inadmissible, prejudicial
evidence. See supra notes 189-222 and accompanying text. In a custody proceeding, a parent
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instances in which a party to an action 232 seeks public exclusion based
on a demonstration of personal detriment,233 the courts may also con-
sider other factors. Trial judges have discretionary authority to limit
public access when required for the proper administration of justice.
. Proper Administration of Justice
Although trial judges generally are required to admit the public to
court proceedings, the judges may do so "with due regard to the size of
the court room [and] the conveniences of the court. ' 23 4 Further, since
the courtroom is subject to the control of the judge,235 he may exclude
"objectionable characters and youth of tender years. 2 36 In addition, to
ensure the proper administration of justice as it relates to a trial, a
judge may order the exclusion or sequestration of witnesses so the testi-
mony of other witnesses cannot be heard.237 A judge may also take any
action that is required to maintain decorum in the court and preserve
the public peace.238 Finally, trial judges may exercise discretion and
exclude the public to protect a witness from embarrassment by reason
of having to testify to delicate or revolting facts.23 9
Exclusion of the public in any of these circumstances is determined
on a case-by-case basis and must be narrowly tailored to serve the in-
terest of assuring the proper administration of justice.24 ° The trial
judge's control over the courtroom provides the necessary discretion to
serve this important interest during the course of any type of proceed-
ing.24 1 Thus, if the proper administration of justice in a custody trial
requires denial of public access, the trial judge could exercise his dis-
cretion and order closure.
For example, a custody proceeding initiated to terminate parental
rights 242 or to declare a minor a dependent of the juvenile court24 3 can
would seek closure in order to protect his interests in security and property. See supra notes 188,
229-30 and accompanying text.
232. This encompasses all types of court cases-both criminal and civil.
233. If the action is a criminal prosecution, the defendant seeking closure will be required to
demonstrate a "proved possibility of prejudice." San Jose Mercury-News, 30 Cal. 3d at 512, 638
P.2d at 663, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 780. If the action is a civil trial, including a custody trial, the party
or parent seeking closure must demonstrate a threat to individual security. See Estate ofHearst,
67 Cal. App. 3d at 784, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
234. People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 245, 37 P. 153, 154 (1894); see also Richmond, 448 U.S.
at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring) (because every courtroom has a finite physical capacity, not all
who wish to attend a trial may do so).
235. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358, 361;Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
236. Hartman, 103 Cal. at 245, 37 P. at 154.
237. See FED. R. EVID. 615; CAL. EVID. CODE §777.
238. Oxnard, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
239. See Kirstowsky, 143 Cal. App. 2d at 754, 300 P.2d at 169.
240. See 102 S. Ct. at 2620, 2621.
241. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-63.
242. CAL. CIV. CODE §232.
Pacfic Law Journal / Vol. 15
be predicated on sexual abuse. Should the child who is the subject of
the custody trial be called to testify, the state has a strong interest in
safeguarding the minor's physical and psychological well-being.2"
When public presence in the courtroom threatens the child's well-be-
ing, the judge should exercise his discretion in accordance with the
holding in Globe,245 and order closure of the proceedings during the
child's testimony.
Despite the existing discretionary authority of judges to limit public
access to the proceedings, the present statutory scheme in California
requires termination proceedings246 and dependency hearings247 to be
conducted in closed court.248 The trial judge has no discretion to deter-
mine whether the circumstances of a particular case warrant public ex-
clusion, except as embodied in the two narrow statutory exceptions to
the closure requirement.249 Even with these exceptions, the statutory
closure requirement is defective. By authorizing the attendance of only
those persons whom the child and his parents request to be present250
or persons having a "direct and legitimate interest in the particular case
or work of the court,"' 251 the statutes completely disregard and frustrate
the interests of the remainder of society in gaining access to the
proceedings.
The present statutory scheme requiring closure is both unnecessary
and unjustified. The scheme is unnecessary because a trial judge always
has discretionary authority to limit public access in order to effect the
proper administration of justice.252 Requiring closure is unjustified be-
cause it unreasonably thwarts the public's legitimate interests in ob-
serving judicial proceedings. Together, these two factors mandate that
the present statutory scheme be reformed.
CONCLUSION
The open trial policy is a long-standing tradition in American juris-
prudence which originally was advanced to prevent the use of the judi-
ciary as an instrument of persecution. In the course of history, the open
trial policy has been instrumental in augmenting and preserving the
public interest in the fair and effective administration of justice, in re-
243. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300.
244. See 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
245. Id.
246. CAL. CIv. CODE §232.
247. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300.
248. See id. §346; CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5.
249. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
250. CAL. CIV. CODE §235.5; CAL. WELF & INST. CODE §346.
251. CAL. CIv. CODE §235.5; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §346.
252. See supra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
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lieving community tension for particular wrongs, and in protecting the
first amendment right of communicating on matters relating to the
functioning of government. Preservation of these important interests
requires that the open trial policy remain firmly rooted in the judicial
process.
In light of these various public interests in maintaining the open trial
system, this comment has analyzed the California practice of denying
public access to custody proceedings predicated on parental abuse. A
careful examination of the competing interests at stake in these types of
custody proceedings reveals that denial of public access can only be
justified by compelling and overriding policy considerations. Only
when a party to a custody trial raises a pressing reason for closure, such
as personal detriment, should the judge exercise his discretion to limit
public access. Moreover, the determination of the necessity for closure
should always be made on a case-by-case basis.
The present mandatory closure rule for custody cases based on pa-
rental abuse completely frustrates the strong public interest in open tri-
als. The closure rule ignores the trial judge's discretionary authority to
limit public access when necessary for the protection of the parties or
the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, the statutory provi-
sions requiring closure should be eliminated to allow public access,
subject only to the trial judge's discretion.
Magi Lachuk

